ReventLens

For compliance, legal & insider-threat teams

A leak radar for prediction markets.

When private information leaks, it increasingly trades on a public market before anyone declares it. ReventLens watches those markets for the early positioning your current tools can't see — and surfaces it as a lead for human review, never an accusation.

The pattern that's emerging

In May 2026 the Justice Department charged a Google engineer with insider trading — not on Google stock, but on Polymarket. According to the charging documents, he had access to Google's confidential Year in Search rankings before they were public, and he bought the winners. The reported profit was around $1.2 million.

It would be easy to write that off as a one-off. It isn't:

Monthly volume on these markets went from under $5B in late 2025 to roughly $24B by spring 2026. As more of your events get a market, more of your private information has somewhere to go.

One legal detail makes this matter for any company, not just regulated firms: the Google case ran on a misappropriation theory. The contract did not have to be a security for the trade to be a crime — closing the loophole people were quietly counting on.

Why account-linking tools miss it

The first employer-side products work by having employees link their prediction-market accounts so compliance can see the activity. That's genuinely useful for the honest employee who follows the rules.

It does not catch the leak. The person misusing your information is not going to link the account they used to do it. In every charged case, the trade ran from an account the employer couldn't see. Account linking shows you the people who declared their accounts. The leak lives in the accounts nobody declared.

What ReventLens does instead

It watches the public and onchain markets tied to your catalysts. When there's unusual early positioning during a window where only insiders should know the outcome, it flags that for a human to review. No account linking. For onchain markets like Polymarket, no cooperation from the venue at all — the trades are already public.

You bring two things you already keep: your embargo calendar and your restricted list. They stay on your side — the tool reads them where they sit and never uploads them.

What it will not do, by design, is name your employee. On public data alone, a signal is held as a lead for review, never an accusation. Putting a name to a wallet comes from your own restricted list or from legal process — not from us guessing. The career risk isn't the alert you missed; it's the confident tool that fingered the wrong person.

What we can show you today

We reconstructed the Google "Year in Search" episode on the real Polymarket trade history. The engine surfaced a single anonymous wallet that took about 14% of the pre-reveal volume on the eventual winner, bought it weeks early at 25 cents, and was right.

What this proves — and what it doesn't It surfaced the behavior a surveillance team would want to look at, before the public knew the answer, and it named no one. It did not, and could not, tell you who the wallet belonged to. We have no measured precision or false-positive rate yet — that comes out of a pilot on your data, not a slide. This is a hindsight reconstruction, not a measure of live detection. The honest version is the only version we'll show you.

What we're looking for

Not a sale — a conversation. We want to sit with a few teams whose events actually trade and learn whether this is a real problem worth solving on your side, and where our read is wrong. If your earnings, launches, M&A, or rulings show up on these markets, you're exactly who we want to learn from.

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